Headscarves return to the CJEU: unfinished business by Howard, Erica
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Howard, Erica ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0848-5033 (2019) Headscarves return to
the CJEU: unfinished business. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law . ISSN
1023-263X (Accepted/In press)
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/28016/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
1 
 
Headscarves return to the CJEU: unfinished business 
 
ABSTRACT  
In 2017, the CJEU brought out its judgments in two cases concerning bans on the wearing of 
Islamic headscarves at work as possible discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
under Directive 2000/78/EC. These judgments led to heavy criticism, mainly because the 
CJEU did not do a rigorous proportionality test and left a number of questions open. Two 
recent preliminary references from courts in Germany present the CJEU with an opportunity 
to expand on the earlier judgments and to answer the questions they left open. It is submitted 
that the CJEU should deal with this unfinished business in a way which respects Europe’s 
religious diversity and ensures that the ground of religion and belief does not become the 
poor relation of EU anti-discrimination law. 
 
Keywords:  
Islamic Headscarves; Religious Discrimination; Direct Discrimination; Indirect 
Discrimination; Proportionality test, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
§1. Introduction 
In March 2017, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
issued its first two judgments concerning prohibitions on the wearing of Islamic headscarves 
at work as possible discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief under Directive 
2000/78/EC.1 The judgments were criticised quite heavily in the literature for a number of 
different reasons, including that they left some questions open.2 There are, at present, two 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L 303/16. These cases are: Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum 
voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v. G4 S Secure Solutions NV, EU:C:2017:203; Case C-
188/15 Asma Bougnaoui, Association de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ADDH) v. Micropole Univers SA, 
EU:C:2017:204. 
2 See: E. Howard, ‘Islamic Head Scarves and the CJEU: Achbita and Bougnaoui’, 24, 3 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law (2017) pp. 348-366 and the literature referred to there. See also: M. Bell, 
‘Leaving Religion at the Door? The European Court of Justice and Religious Symbols in the Workplace’, 17, 4 
Human Rights Law Review (2017) pp. 784-796; S. Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Equality and the Market: the Unhappy 
Fate of Religious Discrimination in Europe’, 13 European Constitutional Law Review (2017) pp. 744-758; S. 
Jolly, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: the European Court of Justice Confronts a Challenge’, 3 
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preliminary references to the CJEU from different courts in Germany concerning the wearing 
of Islamic headscarves at work.3 It is argued here that the questions asked in these two 
preliminary references address a number of the points of criticism raised against the 
judgments in Achbita and Bougnaoui. The CJEU will, therefore, have an opportunity to 
expand on and explain its earlier decisions and, contrary to what it did in the 2017 decisions, 
take a lead in the protection offered by EU law against religion or belief discrimination. This 
article starts with a short summary of Achbita and Bougnaoui and an overview of the 
criticism raised against these cases. Then, the two preliminary references and the questions 
asked, including the views of the referring courts, will be examined. It will be argued that the 
CJEU should reply to the preliminary questions referred to it in such a way as to provide 
protection against religion or belief discrimination which is as strong as the protection 
provided by EU law against the other grounds of discrimination covered. If the CJEU does 
not do this, it will leave religious minorities without the protection provided for other 
minorities. 
§2. Achbita and Bougnaoui 
Both Achbita and Bougnaoui concerned women who wanted to wear an Islamic headscarf to 
work and, when their employer asked them to remove their headscarf, they refused to do so 
and were then dismissed. Ms Achbita was a receptionist working for G4 S who was 
permanently contracted out to a third party. When she informed her employer that she wanted 
to start wearing the Islamic headscarf to work, G4 S replied that this was against their rule 
that employees could not wear visible signs of their political, philosophical or religious 
beliefs in the workplace. The Belgian Court of Cassation asked the CJEU if this was direct 
discrimination on the ground of religion or belief contrary to Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 
2000/78/EC. Ms Bougnaoui worked as a design engineer for Micropole and she occasionally 
went out to work at customers’ sites. She was asked to remove her headscarf after a 
customer’s staff member complained about it and, when she refused, she was also dismissed. 
The French Court of Cassation asked the CJEU whether the wish of a customer to no longer 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Human Rights Law Review (2017) pp. 308-314; T. Loenen, ‘In Search of an EU Approach to 
Headscarf Bans: Where to go After Achbita and Bougnaoui?’, 10, 2 Review of European Administrative Law 
(2017) pp. 47-73; L. Vickers, ‘Achbita and Bougnaoui: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back for Religious 
Diversity in the Workplace’, 8, 2 European Labour Law Journal (2017) pp. 232-257; E. Relano Pastor, 
‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: Achbita and Bougnaoui’, in U. Belavusau and K. Henrard (eds) EU 
Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender (Hart Publishing, 2019), 183-202. 
3 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., OJ C 182/4, 27 May 2019; Case C-341/19 MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ, 
lodged 30 April 2019). 
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have services provided by an employee wearing a headscarf was a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement under Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC. It is worth noting that 
there were diverging opinions of the Advocates General4 in these cases.  
In Achbita, the CJEU held that there was no direct discrimination because the internal rule 
referred ‘to the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs’ and 
thus covered ‘any manifestation of such beliefs without distinction’. The rule was treating all 
workers the same and there was no evidence that the rule was applied differently to Ms 
Achbita.5 According to the CJEU, in Bougnaoui, it was not clear whether the referred 
question was based on a finding of a direct or indirect discrimination but that it was for the 
referring court to decide whether the dismissal was directly or indirectly discriminatory. The 
CJEU referred to Achbita here.6 
Although the CJEU stated in both cases that it was up to the national court to decide whether 
there was direct or indirect discrimination, it did give guidance in Achbita on how to deal 
with indirect discrimination. Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Directive 2000/78/EC determines that  
indirect discrimination is not unlawful if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The CJEU held that a neutrality 
policy was a legitimate aim as it was part of the freedom to conduct a business, guaranteed by 
Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EUCFR).7  
The CJEU then considered whether the ban on visible political, philosophical or religious 
symbols was appropriate and necessary and held that this was the case: as long as the ban was 
genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner and thus did not make a distinction 
between different religions or different (religious, philosophical or political) beliefs; as long 
as the rule was limited to customer-facing employees; and, as long as the employer had 
considered whether the employee could be moved to a job without contact with customers.8 
In Bougnaoui, the CJEU held that the wish of a customer not to be served by someone in a 
headscarf was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement,9 and this decision 
                                                 
4 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S, EUC:2016:38; Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston in Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v. Micropole, EU:C:2016:553. 
5 Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S, paras. 30-32. 
6 Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v .Micropole, paras. 31-32. 
7 Case C-157/15 Achbita v G4 S, paras. 37-38. 
8 Ibid., paras 40-43. 
9 Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v Micropole, paras. 40-41. 
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was generally welcomed by commentators.10 Loenen, for example, writes that it ‘seems a 
convincing reasoning, as it appears hard to argue that the wearing of the headscarf interferes 
with the professional performance of Bougnaoui as an IT-engineer’.11 
However, the two decisions were strongly criticised for three main reasons. First, the CJEU’s 
easy acceptance of neutrality as a legitimate aim which can justify indirect discrimination 
was criticised because the CJEU did not explain in any detail why this was so, especially 
considering the fact that both cases concerned private employers. A duty of neutrality might 
be accepted for employees of public authorities, but ‘extending it to the private sector is a big 
leap’.12 Jolly points out that the CJEU ‘failed to consider the correlation between the freedom 
to run a business and the prohibition on running that business … in a discriminatory manner’ 
and that the CJEU ‘also did not mention the right to working conditions which respect the 
individual’s dignity (art.31 of the Charter)’.13 Moreover, there is also a tension between the 
judgment in Bougnaoui that the wish of a customer not to be served by someone in a 
headscarf was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement and the acceptance, in 
Achbita, that the aim of neutrality can be a legitimate aim. Why would an employer have a 
neutrality policy if it was not for the (anticipated) wishes of customers? 
The second point of criticism is that the CJEU did not appear to apply a very strict necessity 
and proportionality test. It did not balance the needs of the employer with the disadvantages 
of the neutrality rule for the employee and her right to freely manifest her religion as 
guaranteed by Article 10 EUCFR. The CJEU indicated that a neutrality policy would be 
justified: if it was genuinely, consistently and systematically pursued; and, if it was restricted 
to employees in customer-facing roles. Restricting bans to employees who come into contact 
with customers appears to be based on the presumption that customers, when faced with an 
employee wearing a political, philosophical or religious symbol, would attribute the 
convictions expressed through these symbols to the employer. However, there was no 
concrete evidence before the CJEU that this actually happens in practice and the CJEU did 
not seem to require such evidence either.14 Moreover, as Bell writes, ‘it would surely be 
                                                 
10 See the writers mentioned in footnote 2. 
11 T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 64. 
12 E. Brems, European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the Workplace, 26 March 2017: 
https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/test-3/2018/5/26/analysis-european-court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-religious-dress-in-
the-workplace. 
13 S. Jolly, 3 EHRLR (2017) p. 312. 
14 Ibid., p. 313. 
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firmly rejected if an employer sought to place other groups vulnerable to discrimination in 
job roles that avoided contact with customers’.15   
This weak neutrality and proportionality test, as set out by the CJEU, ‘still leaves a very large 
group of workers exposed to the negative effects of a ban on religious clothing or symbols’.16  
It does not promote equality for minority groups, according to Vickers, and has the effect of 
restricting not only employment opportunities but also broader inclusion, thereby creating 
invisibility for religious minorities.17  
A third point of criticism is that the CJEU appears to leave the Member States a certain level 
of discretion in deciding how to regulate the wearing of religious symbols in employment, 
but that it does not give any indication how far this discretion goes.18 In her opinion in 
Achbita, Advocate General Kokott argued for giving a measure of discretion to national 
authorities and courts in applying the proportionality test because the CJEU did not 
necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the EU.19 However, this 
would mean that the protection against religion or belief discrimination in EU law is not as 
strong as the protection against others forms of discrimination. Vickers points out that ‘it 
would seem inconceivable that a court would allow a state to argue that national traditions 
should be allowed to justify sex or race discrimination in employment’ and thus that ‘it is 
questionable whether such reasoning should be accepted in the different context of 
religion’.20 
Accepting different, lower standards for the justification of religious discrimination also goes 
against previous case law of the CJEU which has consistently held that exceptions to the 
principle of equal treatment must be interpreted strictly.21 Moreover, in Bilka Kaufhaus, the 
                                                 
15 M. Bell, 17, 4 HRLR (2017) p. 796. 
16 T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 67; in the same vein: E. Relano Pastor, in Belavusau and Henrard (2019) p. 
197.  
17 L. Vickers, 8, 2 ELLJ (2017) p. 252. 
18 E. Howard, 24, 3 MJ (2017) pp. 360-362; T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) pp. 66-67; L. Vickers, 8, 2 ELLJ 
(2017) pp. 244-247, 249. 
19 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S, para. 99. 
20 L. Vickers, The Role of Choice; and the Margin of Appreciation’, 8 September 2016: 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/09/08/blog-series-the-role-of-choice-and-the-margin-of-appreciation/. See 
also: E. Relano Pastor, in Belavusau and Henrard (2019) pp. 189-90 
21 See, for example: Case C-222/83 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
EU:C:1986:206, para. 36; Case C-273/97 Sirdar v. the Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence 
EU:C:1999:523, para. 23; Case C-285/98 Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Germany EU:C:2000:02, para. 20, (all three 
concerned sex discrimination); Case C-341/08 Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk 
Westfalen-Lippe EU:C:2010:4, para. 60; Case C-447/09 Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
EU:C:2011:573, paras. 56 and 72 (both concerned age discrimination). The latter two cases concerned Articles 
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CJEU explained the three parts of the justification test for indirect sex discrimination: the 
means chosen must correspond to a real need; they must be appropriate to achieving the 
objective pursued; and, they must be necessary to that end.22 The application of the 
justification and proportionality test in Achbita can be criticised for not strictly following any 
of these three requirements, as is clear from the above.  
There were other points of criticism. For example, some commentators agreed with the CJEU 
in Achbita, that there was no direct discrimination, while others argued very strongly that 
there was direct discrimination.23 This is discussed below. 
§3. Preliminary references 
IX v. Wabe e.V.,24 concerned a Muslim woman employee of a company running a number of 
nurseries, who, when returning from parental leave, was asked no longer to wear a headscarf. 
During the employee’s leave, the company had introduced a neutrality policy prescribing that 
employees refrain from wearing any visible signs of political, ideological or religious beliefs. 
The employee refused to remove her headscarf and, after two official warnings, was released 
from work. The company rules were accompanied by guidance which stated that the wearing 
of Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps and Muslim headscarves was not allowed. The 
company’s neutrality policy did not apply to those employees who did not come into contact 
with customers.25  
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg asked the CJEU, first, whether this unilateral neutrality policy 
constituted direct religion or belief discrimination contrary to Directive 2000/78/EC against 
employees who follow certain clothing rules for religious reasons. The second question asked 
whether the policy constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion and/or 
gender against a female employee who, due to her Muslim faith, wears a headscarf. Under 
this second question, the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg asked, in particular whether discrimination 
on the grounds of religion and/or gender can be justified with the employer’s subjective wish 
                                                                                                                                                        
2(5) and 4(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC. A discussion of the question whether this also applies to the exception in 
Article 6(1) which allows for justification of direct discrimination on the ground of age, goes beyond the subject 
of this article.  
22 Case C- 170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus v. Karin Weber von Harz EU:C:1986:204, para. 36 
23 See: E. Howard, 24, 3 MJ (2017) pp. 351-354 and the literature referred to there. 
24 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V.. For the reference decision (in German) see Arbeitsgericht (Labour Court) 
Hamburg 8. Kammer, EUGH-Vorlage vom 21.11.2018, 8 CA 123/18: http://www.rechtsprechung-
hamburg.de/jportal/portal/page/bsharprod.psml?showdoccase=1&doc.id=JURE190001061&st=ent In the 
following all translations by author. 
25 Arbeitsgericht Hamburg. 
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to pursue a policy of political, ideological and religious neutrality even where the employer 
thereby seeks to meet the subjective wishes of his customers. And, the last question was: 
Do Directive 2000/78/EC and/or the fundamental right of freedom to conduct a 
business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union in view of Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC preclude a national regulation 
according to which, in order to protect the fundamental right of freedom of religion, a 
ban on religious clothing may be justified not simply on the basis of an abstract 
capacity to endanger the neutrality of the employer, but only on the basis of a 
sufficiently specific risk, in particular of a specifically threatened economic 
disadvantage for the employer or an affected third party? 
In MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ,26 Müller, a company which runs a number of chemist 
shops, employed MJ, a Muslim woman, since 2002. She had not worn a headscarf at work 
before she went on parental leave. On her return from this leave, she wore a headscarf and 
her employer asked her to take this off as it was against the company rules.  She refused and 
then did not get work. On 21 June 2016, she was again asked to take her headscarf off and, 
when she refused, she was sent home. In July 2016, she received instructions from her 
employer to come to work without any prominent and large-scale signs of religious, 
philosophical and political convictions. This rule applied to all shops and aimed to preserve 
neutrality and avoid conflicts between employees. MJ requested the courts in first and second 
instance to declare the instruction invalid which they did.27 The Bundesarbeitsgericht (the 
highest federal court in labour matters in Germany) asked the CJEU, first, whether indirect 
discrimination on grounds of religion could be justifiable only if an employer’s policy 
prohibited all visible sign of religious, political and philosophical belief rather than such signs 
which are prominent and large scale. If this first question was answered in the negative, the 
Bundesarbeitsgericht asked a second question: whether, in determining if the rule in question 
here is justifiable, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in Article 10 EUCFR and 
Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) may be taken into account; and, whether national rules of constitutional 
status which protect freedom of religion may be taken into account as more favourable 
                                                 
26 Case C-341/19 MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ. For the decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (in Dutch) see: 
https://ecer.minbuza.nl/documents/20142/0/C-341-19+verwijzingsbeschikking_Redacted.pdf/46dff96f-605c-
9311-c299-50e9a1ce2a4e?t=1561725088198 In the following all translations by author. 
27 Bundesarbeitsgericht. 
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provisions within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC. If both of these could 
not be taken into account, the Bundesarbeitsgericht asked whether ‘national rules of 
constitutional status which protect freedom of religion be set aside because of primary EU 
law, even if primary EU law, such as, for example, Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, recognises national laws and practices’.  
It will be clear that the questions referred to the CJEU in these two cases can be linked to the 
three main reasons for criticising the decisions in Achbita and Bougnaoui mentioned above. It 
is argued here that the CJEU is asked to deal with these points of criticism and to clarify the 
issues it left open in the earlier judgments.  These questions will be analysed under a number 
of headings. 
§4. Direct discrimination 
Direct discrimination on the ground of religion or belief takes place where one person is 
treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on the grounds of religion or belief.28 In Achbita, the CJEU held that there was no 
direct discrimination because G4 S’s internal rule banned all visible signs of political, 
philosophical or religious beliefs and applied to all employees in the same way.29 However, 
not everyone agreed with the CJEU that there was no direct discrimination. The two 
Advocates General, in Achbita and Bougnaoui, came to different conclusions, as did some of 
the interveners and commentators, so an argument could certainly have been made for a 
finding of direct discrimination in these cases.30  
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg stated that it considered that there was direct discrimination 
under both Directive 2000/78/EC and the German Algemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz 
(AGG, General Equal Treatment Law), when there was a direct link with a protected 
characteristic; while indirect discrimination occurred where an apparently neutral rule 
affected more people of a certain group. The latter did not apply here, as the rule explicitly 
referred to the characteristic of religion by prohibiting religious signs. The employee in 
question would have been treated differently if she had not been religious and had not wanted 
to express her religion or if she had wanted to wear a headscarf not for religious reasons but 
for reasons of fashion. Therefore, the neutrality policy has an explicitly negative effect linked 
                                                 
28 Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC. 
29 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4 S, paras. 30-32. 
30 See: E. Howard, 24, 3 MJ (2017) pp. 351-354 and the literature referred to there. 
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to the characteristic of religion.31 In this, the Arbeitsgericht follows the decision of the CJEU 
in CHEZ, where the CJEU clarified the difference between direct and indirect discrimination: 
there is direct discrimination when the discrimination ground determines the decision for the 
less favourable treatment or, in other words, where the less favourable treatment is by reason 
of that ground; while indirect discrimination considers the effect of a measure, which is 
‘ostensibly’ neutral or neutral ‘at first glance’.32 
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg continued that the difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination could not be determined by the question whether people with other (protected 
or unprotected) characteristics were treated similarly badly, but only by the question whether 
the unfavourable treatment was explicitly linked to a protected characteristic. For direct 
discrimination, what is decisive is whether the person, who is affected by the treatment, 
suffers disadvantage because of her religion. Direct religious discrimination does not become 
indirect discrimination because non-religious people are also bound by the rule. If this was 
the case, then this would lead to the conclusion that a general animosity to all religions would 
be considered neutral.33  
The Arbeitsgericht refers, among others, to Hennette-Vauchez. She actually calls the 
reasoning of the CJEU in Achbita ‘really perverse, in the sense that it amounts to considering 
that if you discriminate against all members of a group, you actually, no longer are 
discriminating at all’.34 Brems draws a parallel with disability as a protected characteristic 
and writes that it would be unthinkable that the CJEU would accept that a measure excluding 
all disabled people would not constitute direct disability discrimination.35 The Arbeitsgericht 
is, therefore, of the opinion that there is direct discrimination in this case and it is submitted 
that the arguments leading to this conclusion are quite convincing. However, the 
Arbeitsgericht feels that the judgment in Achbita prevents it from accepting this and thus it 
asks the CJEU whether there is direct discrimination.36  
                                                 
31 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., paras. 78-82. 
32 Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:480, para. 109. 
33 Ibid., paras. 83-84. 
34 S. Hennette-Vauchez, 13 ECLR (2017) pp. 748. In the same vein: E. Brems (2017); E. Spaventa, ‘What is the 
point of Minimum Harmonization of Fundamental Rights? Some Further Reflections on the Achbita Case’, EU 
Law Analysis (2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/03/what-is-point-of-minimum-
harmonization.html. 
35 E. Brems (2017). 
36 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., paras. 85-86. 
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That opinions are divided regarding the question whether a rule prohibiting all visible signs 
of religious, political and philosophical convictions constitutes direct or indirect 
discrimination is also clear from the fact that, in MJ, the Bundesarbeitsgericht never 
mentioned direct discrimination but expressed the opinion that the contested rule was 
indirectly discriminatory for Ms MJ, because the general prohibition affected her more than 
other people because of her religion.37  
The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is important because, under 
Directive 2000/78/EC, direct religion or belief discrimination cannot be justified except in 
situations prescribed by the Directive, and, in relation to the employer’s policies as discussed 
in this article, the only relevant justification is the provision for genuine and determining 
occupational requirements. In contrast, indirect discrimination can be justified by a legitimate 
aim and the use of proportionate means to achieve that aim. Indirect discrimination will be 
examined next.   
§5. Indirect discrimination – grounds 
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg, in its second question, asks whether the neutrality policy in 
question constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion and/or gender against a 
female employee who, due to her Muslim faith, wears a headscarf. The possibility that such 
bans constituted (indirect) gender discrimination was not mentioned by the CJEU in either 
Achbita or Bougnaoui. In her opinion in Achbita, Advocate General Kokott considered that 
the ban at issue applied to all religious symbols without distinction and, thus, that there was 
no discrimination ‘between religions’ [her italics]. She continued that the rule  ‘is not one 
directed specifically against employees of Muslim faith, let alone specifically against female 
employees of that religion’; and she pointed out that it would affect Jewish men wearing 
skullcaps, Sikh men wearing turbans and Christian employees who wanted to wear a clearly 
visible cross.38 In Bougnaoui, Advocate General Sharpston stated that the issues that arise ‘do 
not relate to the Islamic faith or to members of the female sex alone’.39 Therefore, both 
Advocates General rejected the argument that the bans were discriminatory on the grounds of 
gender. 
                                                 
37 Case C-341/19 MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ, para. 20. 
38 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S, para. 49.  
39 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v. Micropole, para. 30. 
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In IX, the applicant claimed that the policy constituted discrimination on the grounds of 
gender and ethnic origin. The prohibition was, according to her, aimed at headscarves and 
thus only concerns women, so it is gender discrimination. And it concerns a larger proportion 
of women with a migrant background, and thus it is discriminatory on the grounds of ethnic 
origin.40 However, the Arbeitsgericht did not mention discrimination on the grounds of ethnic 
origin in the reference.  
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg argues that the prohibition on religious symbols affects some 
religions more than others: Muslim women who want to wear a headscarf and Jewish men 
who wear a skullcap are prohibited from doing so, but Christians can wear a cross as they can 
wear this under their clothing. The court also points out that Jewish women who wear a wig 
for religious reasons can do so because a wig is usually not recognisable as such. Statistically, 
the rule in this case affects almost exclusively Muslim women, according to the 
Arbeitsgericht, because the majority of employees in nurseries are female and the number of 
Jewish male employees is negligible.41 
Blair writes that ‘the dress requirements of males from ethnic minority groups (Sikhs apart) 
have seldom caused problems. Women much more than men are subject to highly restricted 
dress codes’.42 And, McColgan writes: ‘the impact of any restriction on the visible 
manifestation of religious belief is felt disproportionately by women who are forced to 
choose between adherence to religious obligation and the pursuit of education or economic 
empowerment through work’.43 Therefore, such bans generally affect women more than men, 
and, following the CJEU in Bilka Kaufhaus, they would be indirectly discriminatory on the 
ground of gender unless objectively justified.44 The argument that bans on religious symbols 
constitute gender discrimination or discrimination on a combination of gender, ethnic and/or 
religious grounds has also been brought forward in the literature.45 However, claiming 
                                                 
40 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., para. 23. 
41 Ibid., para. 92. 
42 A. Blair, ‘Case Commentary: R (SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School – Human Rights 
and Religious Dress in Schools’,  17, 3 Child and Family Law Quarterly (2005) 399-413, p. 411. 
43 A. McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’, 38, 1 Industrial Law Journal (2009) 
p. 18. 
44 Case C- 170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus. 
45 See, for example: T. Loenen, ‘The Headscarf Debate: Approaching the Intersection of Sex, religion, and Race 
under the European Convention on Human Rights and EU Equality Law’, in D. Schiek and V. Chege (eds)  
European Union Non-discrimianation Law Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensioanl Equality Law 
(Routledge–Cavendish, 2009), pp. 313-328; L. Roseberry, ‘Religion, Ethnicity and Gender in the Danish 
headscarf Debate’, in ibid., pp. 329-351; U. Sacksofsky, ‘Religion and Equality in Germany - the Headscarf 
Debate from a Constitutional Perspective’, in ibid., pp. 353-370; F. Ast and R. Spielhaus, ‘Tackling Double 
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discrimination on a combination of grounds might be difficult, unless, in this case, either 
religious discrimination or gender discrimination can be proven. In Parris, where 
discrimination on the grounds of age and sexual orientation or on a combination of these 
grounds was claimed, the CJEU held that there was no sexual orientation discrimination; no 
age discrimination; and, while recognising that discrimination may be based on several 
grounds, it held that no new category of discrimination could exist where discrimination on 
either one of the grounds had not been established.46 
It has also been pointed out frequently that such bans are linked to prejudice against and 
stereotypes of Muslim women.47 In fact, the latter was used as an argument for accepting that 
there was direct discrimination in this case.48 
Based on the above, it is submitted that the first two questions of the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg 
are pertinent: there are arguments for accepting that there is direct religion or belief 
discrimination; and, if the CJEU does not find direct discrimination, for accepting indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and/or gender. 
§6. Indirect discrimination – legitimate aim 
According to Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC, indirect discrimination is not unlawful 
if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. In Achbita, the CJEU held, in relation to the legitimate aim, that 
an employer’s neutrality policy was legitimate because it related to the freedom to conduct a 
business as guaranteed by Article 16 EUCFR, notably where only those workers who are in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Victimization of Muslim Women in Europe: The Intersectional Response’, 16, 2 Mediterranean Journal of 
Human Rights (2012) pp. 357-382; E. Relano Pastor, ‘Towards Substantive Equality for Religious Believers in 
the Workplace? Two Supernational European Courts, Two Different Approaches’, 5, 2 Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion (2016) p. 277; T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 67-68; E. Spaventa, (2017); L. Vickers (2017) p. 
253; A. Sledzinska-Simon, ‘Unveiling the Culture of Justification in the European Union, Religious Clothing 
and the Proportionality Review’, in U. Belavusau and K. Henrard (2019), 207. 
46 Case C-443/15 Parris v. Trinity College Dublin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:897, paras. 80-81. 
47 E. Bribosia and I. Rorive, ‘ECJ Headscarf Series (4): The Dark Side of Neutrality’, Strasbourg Observers 
(2016), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/09/14/ecj-headscarf-series-4-the-dark-side-of-neutrality/; E. 
Brems, ECJ Headscarf Series (5): The Field in Which Achbita Will Land - A Brief Sketch of Headscarf 
Persecution in Belgium’, Strasbourg Observers (2016), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/09/16/ecj-
headscarf-series-5-the-field-in-which-achbita-will-land-a-brief-sketch-of-headscarf-persecution-in-belgium/; S. 
Ouald Chaib, ‘ECJ Headscarf Series (6): The Vicious Circle of Prejudice against Muslim Women’, Strasbourg 
Observers (2016), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/09/20/ecj-headscarf-series-6-the-vicious-circle-of-
prejudices-against-muslim-women/; E. Brems (2017); E. Relano Pastor, in Belavusau and Henrard (2019), p. 
197. 
48 See E. Howard, 24, 3 MJ (2017) p. 353-354. 
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contact with the employer’s customers are covered.49 The CJEU was, as mentioned above, 
criticised for not explaining why this was a legitimate aim, especially as in both Achbita and 
Bougnaoui, the employers were private employers. The new cases referred to the CJEU 
similarly concern private employers and, thus, what was said above applies here as well.  
The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg refers to what the CJEU held in relation to a neutrality policy 
being a legitimate aim but then queries the relation between this Charter right and the 
German Constitution.50 It then goes on to consider the decision in Bougnaoui that the wish of 
a customer not to be served by a person with a Islamic headscarf is not a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement, and wonders why it is then allowed to prohibit the 
same employee to wear a headscarf when the employer makes the wish of the customers their 
own through a general neutrality policy.51 This echoes the comments about the tension 
between the two cases mentioned above. As Loenen writes, the CJEU in Bougnaoui clearly 
stated that subjective feelings from customers who respond negatively to expressions of 
Islamic belief, ‘cannot be a legitimate reason for a headscarf ban. If this is the case more 
general neutrality policies which proactively play into similar attitudes would seem equally 
unacceptable’.52 In fact, in IX, the employer stated that the parents especially appreciated the 
neutrality policy and that they, without it, would take their children out; and, that the number 
of applications for places was down.53  
Therefore, the neutrality policy in this case was very clearly based on the wishes of the 
customers of the nursery. Advocate General Sharpston, in Bougnaoui, drew attention to: 
 the insidiousness of the argument ‘but we need to do X because otherwise our 
customers won’t like it’. Where the customer’s attitude may itself be indicative of 
prejudice based on one of the ‘prohibited factors’, such as religion, it seems to me 
particularly dangerous to excuse the employer from compliance with an equal treatment 
requirement in order to pander to that prejudice. Directive 2000/78 is intended to confer 
protection in employment against adverse treatment (that is, discrimination) on the 
basis of one of the prohibited factors. It is not about losing one’s job in order to help the 
employer’s profit line. 
                                                 
49 Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S, para. 37-38. 
50 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., para. 98. 
51 Ibid., para. 100. 
52 T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 66. 
53 Ibid., para. 33. 
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The question can also be raised if the decision in Achbita is compatible with what the CJEU 
held in Feryn.54 In the latter case, one of the directors of a company installing garage and 
security doors made a statement on local radio that, although the company was seeking to 
recruit new employees, they could not employ ‘immigrants’ because customers were 
reluctant to give them access to their private residences for the duration of the works. The 
CJEU held that such a statement constituted direct discrimination on the grounds of racial and 
ethnic origin under Directive 2000/43/EC,55 because such a public declaration was clearly 
likely to dissuade some candidates from applying for jobs with this employer.56 It can be 
argued that a neutrality policy, such as the ones in IX and MJ, would dissuade some 
candidates from applying for jobs with these employers and, therefore, constitutes (direct) 
discrimination. Or, if this argument is not accepted, has the CJEU, with its decisions in Feryn 
and Achbita, created higher levels of protection against racial or ethnic origin discrimination 
than against religion or belief discrimination? It will be clear that the CJEU judgment in 
Feryn can also be used to argue for a finding of direct discrimination in IX. 
The Bundesarbeitsgericht accepts, in line with the CJEU decisions, that a neutrality policy is 
a legitimate aim.57 The employer in this case also argues that the neutrality rule is legitimate, 
referring to Achbita. The employer’s aim in this case is, among others, to prevent conflicts 
between employees, as such conflicts, based on difference in religion and culture, have 
happened three times in the past, although none involved the wearing of a headscarf.58 In this 
case, the wish of customers is not mentioned. 
§7. Indirect discrimination – necessity and proportionality 
If a neutrality policy is a legitimate aim, the next question to consider is whether the means to 
achieve this aim are proportionate and necessary. In MJ, the Bundesarbeitsgericht asks 
whether the policy in this case, which only prohibits prominent and large scale signs of 
religious, political and philosophical belief, can be justified. This raises the question when is 
a sign is prominent and large scale? Based on what happened in this case, a headscarf is 
clearly seen as such. A small Christian cross or star of David on a chain or worn on a lapel 
                                                 
54 Case C-54/07 Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:397 
55 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. 
56 Case C-54/07 Feryn, para. 25. 
57 Case C-341/19 MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ, para. 21. 
58 Ibid., para. 9-10. 
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would probably not be prominent and large scale, but what about a Jewish skullcap? A Sikh 
turban will probably also be seen as a prominent and large scale symbol. It can, therefore, be 
argued that this rule differentiates between religions. In Achbita, the CJEU mentioned that G4 
S’s neutrality policy covered all manifestations of political, religious and philosophical 
beliefs without distinction and treated all employees equally.59 This led the CJEU to the 
conclusion that the rule did not constitute direct discrimination. The rule in MJ, however, 
does not cover all manifestations of beliefs equally. This rule differentiates between religions 
and thus, following the CJEU in Achbita, would constitute (direct) religion or belief 
discrimination and cannot be justified.  
The second question referred to the CJEU by the Bundesarbeitsgericht asks whether the right 
to freedom of religion as guaranteed in Article 10 EUCFR and Article 9 ECHR may be taken 
into account in the decision on justification and proportionality. It is submitted here that not 
only Article 10, but also other articles of the Charter should be taken into account. There is 
the already mentioned Article 31 EUCFR, which contains the right of every worker to 
working conditions which respect their dignity; Article 21, which contains the right to non-
discrimination on the ground of, among others, religion and belief; Article 22, which declares 
that the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity; and, Article 23 which 
determines that ‘equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including 
employment, work and pay’.  
This is based on the fact that Directive 2000/78EC itself, in Recital 1, refers to fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, and to the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of law. The latter rights have been, as the CJEU 
mentions in Achbita, reaffirmed in the EUCFR.60 The adoption of the EUCFR shows the EU 
commitment to improve the protection of fundamental rights across the Union; and, as 
Loenen writes, ‘to live up to this commitment one would expect the CJEU to strive as a 
matter of general principle for a high level of protection of the rights and freedom of workers, 
including their religious freedom’.61 This also includes their rights under Articles 21, 22, 23 
and 31 EUCFR. 
                                                 
59 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4 S, para. 30. 
60 Ibid., paras. 26-27. 
61 T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 71 
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The CJEU has consistently held that exceptions to the right to equal treatment must be 
interpreted restrictively, as mentioned above, and this also suggests that the rights of 
employees to equal treatment must weigh heavily in the proportionality test. This is further 
supported by the fact that the CJEU has generally given a purposive and expansive 
interpretation to the EU provisions against discrimination and has, through this interpretation, 
increased the protection for victims of discrimination, although there are three exceptions to 
this: Parris (in relation to discrimination on a combination of grounds), Achbita and 
Bougnaoui (both in relation to religion or belief).62 
More support for the argument that all applicable articles of the EUCFR must be taken into 
account in the proportionality test can be found in the three part test established in Bilka 
Kaufhaus, referred to above. This test includes that the means chosen to achieve the 
legitimate aim pursued must be necessary to that end.63 A measure is not necessary if there 
are alternative ways to achieve the same aim, which are less discriminatory, less of an 
infringement on the principle of equal treatment.64 This is underpinned by the case law of the 
CJEU.65 For example, in Lommers, the CJEU stated that the principle of proportionality 
‘requires …that the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the 
requirements of the aim thus pursued’.66And, in Léger, the CJEU held that the proportionality 
test implies that, ‘when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must 
be had to the least onerous among them’.67 
Sledzinska-Simon writes that the proportionality test typically includes three questions.68 
First, ‘whether there was a rational connection between the aim and the means’ (which author 
refers to as ‘suitability’). The second question is ‘whether the impairment of the right was 
minimal, and there are no alternative, less impairing means that would serve the aim equally 
                                                 
62 Case C-443/15 Parris; Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4 S; Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v Micropole. For more on 
this argument see: E. Howard, ‘EU Anti-discrimination Law: Has the CJEU stopped Moving Forward?’, 18, 2-3 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law (2018) 60-81. 
63 Case C-170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus, para. 36 
64 See on this, D. Schiek, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, in D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell (eds.), Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, 
2007), p. 357; S. Haverkort-Speekenbrink, European Non-Discrimination Law - A Comparison of EU law and 
the ECHR in the Field of Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion in Public Employment with an Emphasis 
on the Islamic Headscarf Issue (Intersentia, 2012), p. 76; L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious 
Discrimination and the Workplace (Bloomsbury, 2016), p. 66. 
65 Case C-222/83 Johnston, para. 38; Case C-273/97 Sirdar, para. 26; Case C-285/98 Kreil, para. 23; Case C-
476/99, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, EU:C:2002:183, para. 39. 
66 Case C-476/99, Lommers, para. 39. 
67 Case C-528/13 Léger v. Ministre des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des Femmes, Établissement 
Français du Sang, EU:C:2015:288, para. 58., 
68 A. Sledzinska-Simon, in Belavusau and Henrard (2019) p. 210. 
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well (necessity)’. This corresponds to the third part of the test in Bilka Kaufhaus and confirms 
what was stated above. And, the third question, according to Sledzinska-Simon is ‘whether a 
fair balance has been struck between the benefit of achieving the aim and the harm resulting 
from the infringement of the right’.69 According to Sledzinska-Simon, the CJEU uses this 
proportionality test in cases concerning discrimination.70 In relation to Achbita, she writes 
that ‘clearly, the court [CJEU] failed to engage in a meaningful proportionality analysis that 
should be at the heart of a fundamental rights case such as that at hand’.71 And, Brems writes 
that the CJEU ‘does not even mention the applicant’s religious freedom or the importance of 
the headscarf for her’. She continues that ‘it is hard to accept that the ECJ [CJEU] has 
genuinely conducted a proportionality assessment if the judgment does not show any 
evidence of the weight that is attributed to the interests on one side of the balance’.72  
All this very clearly indicates that, in deciding on proportionality, the interests of the 
individual and their rights must be weighed in the balance. There appears to be no reason to 
limit this to the right not to be discriminated against under the EU anti-discrimination 
directives. All rights of both parties should be weighed in the balance and the right of the 
employer under Article 16 EUCFR, which the CJEU took into account in Achbita, should be 
balanced against the employee’s rights under the EUCFR: the right to freedom of religion 
(Article 10), the right to be free from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
(Article 21) and the right to dignity at work (Article 31). Moreover, Articles 22 and 23 should 
also be taken into account. Only by doing this can the CJEU ensure ‘that the principle of 
equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of the aim thus 
pursued’, as mentioned in Lommers.73  
Advocate General Sharpston, in Bougnaoui, states that reconciling the employee’s freedom to 
manifest their religion – ‘whose scope and possible limitation in the employment context are 
at the heart of the proceedings before the national court’ – and the employer’s right to 
conduct his business will require ‘a delicate balancing act between two competing rights’.74  
In her assessment of the proportionality, Sharpston states that ‘the starting point for any 
analysis must be that an employee has, in principle, the right to wear religious apparel or a 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p.  212. 
71 Ibid., p. 223. 
72 Brems (2017). 
73 Case C-476/99, Lommers, para. 39. 
74 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v. Micropole, para. 73.  
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religious sign but that the employer also has, or may have, the right to impose restrictions’.75 
This also supports the argument that the right to freely manifests one’s religion in Article 10 
EUCFR must be taken into account. And, if this Charter right is considered, than all rights in 
the Charter applicable to a case should be weighed in the balance.  
§7. Status national constitutional norms and Article 8 Directive 2000/78/EC 
The German Constitution guarantees, in Article 4, freedom of religion. Restrictions on this 
right can be justified under certain circumstances. However, this cannot simply be justified 
on the basis of an abstract capacity to endanger the neutrality of the employer, but only on the 
basis of a sufficiently specific risk, in particular of a specifically threatened economic 
disadvantage for the employer or an affected third party, as is clear from one of the referred 
questions in IX.76 
The last question of the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg and the two final questions of the 
Bundesarbeitsgericht concern Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC, which determines that 
Member States may introduce or maintain provisions which are more favourable to the 
protection of the principle of equal treatment than those laid down in the Directive. More 
specifically, both referring courts question whether national constitutional guarantees of the 
right to freedom of religion can offer more protection or if these guarantees should be set 
aside because of primary EU law, like Article 16 EUCFR, even if such law recognises 
national law and practices.77  
According to Loenen, the rulings in Achbita and Bougnaoui allow for different 
interpretations. On the one hand, an interpretation is possible which reads that the decisions 
allow headscarf bans under certain conditions. On the other hand, ‘an interpretation is 
possible which reads the conditions mentioned as minimum requirements only, leaving a 
fuller and strict assessment of the headscarf ban to the national level’.78  
                                                 
75 Ibid., para. 122. Although Sharpston discusses proportionality in relation to Article 4(1) of Directive 
2000/78/EC, the same can be said to apply to the justification and proportionality test for indirect discrimination 
in Article 2(2)(b), as both require a legitimate aim and proportionate means to achieve that aim, 
76 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V., question 2(b). 
77 Article 16 EUCFR determines that: the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and 
national law and practices is recognised. 
78 T. Loenen, 10, 2 REAL (2017) p. 69. Author does not expand on this. 
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Spaventa also refers to the fact that Directive 2000/78/EC intends to set only minimum 
standards and that the Member States can provide more protection.79 She writes that ‘in 
theory then, the Achbita ruling should not be seen as the last word in relation to the treatment 
of religious people at work’; and, that Member States can pass legislation to prohibit private 
employers from requiring religious neutrality from employees. However, Spaventa continues 
that things are slightly more complicated in the EU context. ‘In particular there is nothing in 
the [Achbita] ruling to indicate that the Directive sets only minimum standards’, so that it 
would be open to the Member States to go further in protecting people holding religious 
beliefs.80 According to Spaventa, the reference to the Charter ‘is important because, in the 
EU context, when the Charter applies it sets the fundamental rights standard’. This means that 
Member States wishing to provide more extensive protection against religious discrimination, 
‘might be prevented from doing so since, pursuant the Achbita ruling, it would infringe the 
right to conduct a business as protected by the Charter’. The CJEU ‘sets the standard – 
employers have a fundamental right, albeit with some limitations, to limit the employees’ 
right not to be discriminated against’. Spaventa asks then ‘what is the point of minimum 
harmonization directives if the upward discretion of the member States is so curtailed’?81 
Author refers to Alemo Herron where the CJEU held that:  
Article 3 of Directive 2001/23, read in conjunction with Article 8 of that directive 
[allowing Member States to provide more extensive protection], cannot be interpreted 
as entitling the Member States to take measures which, while being more favourable to 
employees, are liable to adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to 
conduct a business.82 
Cloots expresses a similar view where she writes that ‘following the CJEU’s Melloni-
doctrine,83 national authorities and courts will no longer be free to apply higher national 
standards of rights protection to similar headscarf cases, for doing so would compromise “the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law”’.84 She continues: ‘nor could a national judge 
subject such a corporate dress code to a more stringent proportionality review. The CJEU has 
determined the correct balance between non-discrimination and the freedom to conduct a 
                                                 
79 E. Spaventa (2017). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Case C-426/11 Alemo Herron and Others v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd, EU:C:2013:521, para. 36. 
83 Case C-399/11 Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107. 
84 E. Cloots, ‘The CJEU’s Headscarf Decision: Melloni Behind the Veil?’ Verfassungblog (2016), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-cjeus-headscarf-decisions-melloni-behind-the-veil/. 
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business for the entire Union’.85 In Melloni, the CJEU had to interpret Article 53 EUCFR, 
which determines that:  
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, 
by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the 
Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the 
Member States' constitutions. 
In Melloni, the CJEU rejected the interpretation of Article 53 EUCFR by the national court 
because that would allow Member States ‘to apply the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights guaranteed by its constitution when that standard is higher than that deriving from the 
Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority over the application of provisions of EU 
law’.86 This interpretation, according to the CJEU, would undermine the principle of primacy 
of EU law because ‘it would allow a member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully 
in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that 
State’s constitution’.87 The CJEU then held that: 
 It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for 
national implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply 
national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of 
protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.88 
Cloots suggests that this and the CJEU judgments in Achbita and Bougnaoui mean that 
Member States cannot provide more protection against religious discrimination and this is 
supported by Spaventa. However, Loenen appears to say that the judgments can be 
interpreted in such a way that Member States can provide more protection.  
The judgments have led to reactions in different Member States which also show some 
uncertainty over their meaning. For example, in Sweden, the effect of the cases, that Article 
16 EUCFR sets a maximum protection level, was seen as reducing the protection level which 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Case C-399/11 Melloni, paras. 56-57. 
87 Ibid., para. 58 
88 Ibid. para. 60. 
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would otherwise have applied under the Swedish Discrimination Act, at least with regard to 
private employers.89 On the other hand, in the UK, an urgent commons question was asked in 
Parliament on the day after the decisions had been delivered about the implications for the 
UK. Concerns were raised as to the compatibility of the judgments with the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment in Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom.90 The 
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Women and Equality replied that the two cases 
were compatible; that ‘the law is clear and remains unchanged’; and, that ‘the Government 
did not want employers mistakenly thinking that the rulings gave them any authority to sack 
public-facing staff who wore headscarves or any other religious symbols’.91 Therefore, 
Sweden appears to explain the judgments in the same way as Cloots and Spaventa do, but the 
UK seems to interpret the judgments as leaving room for more favourable provisions in 
national law. 
Elsewhere, Spaventa explains that Melloni means that ‘national courts are prevented from 
imposing their own constitutional standards in those cases in which to do so would affect the 
uniform application of EU law, that is, when EU law leaves no discretion to Member 
States’.92 She continues that ‘when EU law leaves space for the exercise of discretion by 
national authorities, the Charter only provides Member States with a floor of rights leaving 
national authorities (and national courts) the freedom to apply their own (higher and 
differing) standards’.93 And, according to Besselink,  
If there is sufficient discretion for Member States in the implementation of EU law - or 
if EU law otherwise allows for diversity - primacy, unity and effectiveness are not at 
stake. Such discretion and diversity exist when a directive can be implemented in 
                                                 
89 E. Howard, Religious Clothing and Symbols in Employment. A Legal Analysis of the Situation in the EU 
Member States, European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-discrimination, European 
Commission, Directorate General for Justice and Consumers (2017), p. 78, 
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90 Ibid, p. 78-79. ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 January 2013, Application 
Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10. This is discussed in more detail below. 
91 See: F. Cranmer, ‘Urgent Commons Question on CJEU Rulings in Achbita and Bougnaoui’, Law & Religion 
UK (2017), http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2017/03/15/urgent-commons-question-on-cjeu-rulings-in-
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92 E. Spaventa, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds) European Union 
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various ways, such as in cases of minimum harmonisation, or explicit references to 
national standards.94 
As mentioned, Article 16 EUCFR makes explicit reference to national law and practices. 
And, according to Article 288 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved but leave the national authorities the 
choice of form and method. Therefore, all Directives leave some discretion to the Member 
States, but is this enough to apply the above? In particular, does Directive 2000/78/EC leave 
enough discretion to the Member States to allow them the freedom to apply their own higher 
standards? Alemo Herron, mentioned above, suggests that the clause in Article 8(1) of 
Directive 2000/78/EC is not enough. It will ultimately be up to the CJEU to give a definite 
answer to this question. Whether it will do so in these new headscarf cases remains to be seen 
as the CJEU might not need to address this question depending on its reply to the other 
referred questions. 
In addition, the answer to this question is not very important for the argument made here, 
which is that the CJEU itself, in Achbita, should have used a more thorough proportionality 
test to establish whether the discrimination was justified. It was submitted that the CJEU 
should have taken account not only the employer’s freedom to conduct a business under 
Article 16 EUCFR, but also of the Charter rights which protect the employee’s freedom to 
manifest their religion, their right to be free from discrimination and their right to working 
conditions which respect their dignity. 
Article 10 EUCFR corresponds to Article 9 ECHR and thus, according to Article 52(3) 
EUCFR, this right must be given the same meaning and scope as the Convention right. 
According to the Explanations on Article 52(3), this includes the limitations to the rights as 
authorised by the Convention; and, this reference to the ECHR covers both the text and the 
Protocols to it and the case law of both the ECtHR and the CJEU.95 Therefore, the case law 
of the ECtHR on Article 10 should be taken into account by the CJEU. In Eweida and 
Others, mentioned above, a British Airways employee complained that the prohibition to 
wear a small cross at work as a manifestation of her belief was a violation of her right under 
Article 9 ECHR. The ECtHR accepted the employer’s wish to promote a neutral image as a 
                                                 
94 L. Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’, 39, 4 European Law Review (2014) p. 
546. 
95 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/33. 
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legitimate aim, but then concluded that ‘there was no evidence that the wearing of other, 
previously authorised, items of religious clothing by other employees had any negative 
impact on the employer’s brand or image. And, because there was no evidence of any real 
encroachment on the interests of others, the ECtHR found that Eweida’s freedom of religion 
was violated and that the interference was not justified.96 This suggests that the ECtHR is of 
the opinion that an employer’s neutrality policy in relation to clothing can only be justified if 
there is concrete evidence that not having one threatens the employer’s interests. It is 
submitted here that the CJEU should follow this and require that the employers in IX and MJ 
provide evidence of a concrete threat to their interests. This comes close to the requirement in 
the German Constitution that there needs to be evidence of a sufficiently specific risk to the 
employer. 
§8. Conclusion 
Two preliminary references relating to the wearing of Islamic headscarves at work - IX and 
MJ - have been made to the CJEU97 and, therefore, that Court will get another opportunity to 
interpret and clarify the EU provisions against religion and belief discrimination. The CJEU 
has decided two cases – Achbita and Bougnaoui - regarding this issue in 201798 and the 
judgments in these cases were criticised for a number of reasons: the CJEU’s easy acceptance 
of neutrality as a legitimate aim for justification of indirect discrimination, especially where it 
concerned private employers, and the role played by the wishes of customers in adopting a 
neutrality policy; the lack of rigour in applying the proportionality test; and, the uncertainty 
of the level of discretion left to the Member States to regulate the wearing of religious 
clothing in employment. The questions in the two preliminary references address many of 
these points. 
After an overview of the judgments in Achbita and Bougnaoui and the criticism raised against 
these, the questions in the preliminary references have been examined. There is support for 
the argument that an employer’s policy, prohibiting the wearing of any visible signs of 
political, ideological or religious beliefs, constitutes direct religion or belief discrimination. 
As the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg argues, applying the CJEU’s definition of direct 
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97 Case C-804/18 IX v. Wabe e.V.; Case C-341/19 MH Müller Handels GmbH v. MJ. 
98 Case C-157/15 Achbita v. G4 S; Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui v. Micropole. 
24 
 
discrimination in Chez99 to the case could lead to a finding of direct discrimination. What the 
CJEU held in Feryn100 could also support this. And, it could be argued that there is direct 
discrimination because the neutrality policy is based on stereotypes and prejudices. Although 
the Bundesarbeitsgericht does not ask about direct discrimination, it was argued that the 
policy in that case would constitute (direct) religion or belief discrimination because it does 
not cover all manifestations of beliefs equally. 
The preliminary references raised a number of issues regarding indirect discrimination. First, 
it was submitted that a policy of neutrality constitutes indirect discrimination on the grounds 
of religion or belief and gender and on a combination of these grounds. Second, in relation to 
a neutrality policy being accepted as a legitimate aim which could justify indirect 
discrimination, it was suggested that the CJEU should explain why this is so as the employers 
in both the earlier cases and the preliminary reference cases are private employers. The CJEU 
should also explain why, if the wish of a customer not to be served by someone wearing a 
headscarf is not a genuine and determining occupational requirement, it is allowed to prohibit 
the same employee to wear a headscarf when the employer makes the wish of the customers 
their own through a general neutrality policy, as the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg asks.101 
Third, it was submitted that a policy such as that in MJ, which only prohibits prominent and 
large scale signs of religious, political and philosophical beliefs, constitutes direct 
discrimination. However, if the CJEU sees this as indirect discrimination, it should hold that 
this cannot be justified because it is not a necessary and proportionate means to achieve the 
aim pursued. The more difficult question here is what should be taken into account in the 
decision on justification of indirect discrimination. It was submitted that, in deciding on 
proportionality, the rights and interests of both parties must be weighed in the balance and 
that this includes not only the employer’s freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 EUCFR), 
but also the Charter rights which protect the employee’s freedom to manifest their religion 
(Article 10), their right to be free from discrimination (Article 21) and their right to working 
conditions which respect their dignity (Article 31). Articles 22 and 23 EUCFR should also be 
taken into account. 
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The preliminary references also raised questions on the status of national constitutional norms 
and their relation to Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC. Both referring courts ask whether 
national guarantees of the right to freedom of religion can offer more protection or if such 
constitutional rules should be set aside because of primary EU law, even if such law 
recognises national law and practices, as Article 16 EUCFR does. There has been confusion 
regarding the meaning of the judgments in Achbita and Bougnaoui for the national laws in 
the Member States and different opinions were brought forward regarding whether these 
judgments allow for stricter rules at the national level.102 However, it was submitted that it 
was up to the CJEU to decide on this question. For the argument made here, the question was 
not very relevant, as it was submitted that the CJEU itself, in Achbita, should have used a 
more thorough proportionality test to establish whether the discrimination was justified. If the 
CJEU decides that there is indirect discrimination in IX and MJ, it should apply a more 
rigorous proportionality test, by using the three questions given by Sledzinska-Simon: is there 
a rational connection between the aim and the means; is the impairment of the right minimal, 
and are there no alternative, less impairing means that would serve the aim equally well; and, 
has a fair balance has been struck between the benefit of achieving the aim and the harm 
resulting from the infringement of the right.103 This should include a consideration of all 
rights and interest involved for both parties. Only by doing this, will the CJEU provide 
protection against religion or belief discrimination which is on a par with the protection 
provided against discrimination on the other grounds covered by EU law.  
 Therefore, the two preliminary references provide the CJEU with the opportunity to address 
a number of issues that it left unanswered in Achbita and Bougnaoui and to demonstrate that 
the ground of religion and belief is not the poor relation of EU anti-discrimination law. In 
this, the CJEU can show that it respects the Union’s religious diversity, as Article 22 EUCFR 
requires it to do. 
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